This section contains the course texts and a list of readings by session.
Texts
Many of the readings are from the four main texts:
Watson, Gary, ed. Free Will. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 019925494X.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza, eds. Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. ISBN: 0801481597.
Dennett, Daniel C. Freedom Evolves. New York, NY: Viking, 2003. ISBN: 0670031860.
Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. ISBN: 9780262731621.
Of these, only the Watson, which is a recent collection of key papers, is really essential to start with. The Fischer and Ravizza provides a number of additional papers that might be interesting; but I wouldn't advise buying it straightaway unless you are very keen. The Dennett and Wegner books raise various issues about the bearing of empirical work; we'll be discussing this towards the end of the course.
In addition, a number of other books are available:
Kane, Rober, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN: 0195133366.
O'Conner, Timothy W., ed. Agents, Causes and Event: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 0195091574.
O'Conner, Timothy. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN: 0195133080.
Wolf, Susan. Freedom Within Reason. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990. ISBN: 0195056167.
Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996. ISBN: 0195105508.
Roessler, Johannes, and Naomi Eilan, eds. Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues In Philosophy and Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 0199245622.
Readings by Session
| LEC # | TOPICS | READINGS |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Introductory Session | |
| 2 | The Classical Compatibilist Account |
Nagel, Thomas. "Freedom." In Free Will. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651, chapter XXI. |
| 3 | Refining the Consequence Argument and "Could have done otherwise" |
Watson. "Introduction." In Free Will. pp. 1-4. As much as you feel you can read of: van Inwagen, Peter. "An Argument for Incompatibilism." In Free Will. Notes on Modal Logic and Counterfactuals (see lecture notes) |
| 4 | Denying Closure of Unavoidability | Slote, Michael. "Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem." Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982). |
| 5 | Lewis on Law Breaking |
Lewis, David. "Are we free to break the laws?" In Free Will. For background on this have a look at: ———. "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow." Noûs 13 (1979): 455-76. |
| 6 | Modal Metaphysics |
Stalnaker, Robert. "Possible Worlds." Nous 10, no. 1 (March 1976): 65-75. Additional Reading Rosen, Gideon. "Modal Fictionalism." Mind, New Series, 99, no. 395 (July 1990): 327-354. |
| 7 | More Modal Metaphysics |
Lewis's footnote on impossible worlds: Lewis, David K. Footnote 3 in |
| 8 | Libertarianism I | Clarke, Randolph. "Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will." Noûs 27, no. 2 (1993): 191-203. |
| 9 | Libertarianism II | Kane, Robert. "Two Kinds of Incompatibilism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 2 (1989): 219-254. |
| 10 | Time Travel |
Lewis, David. "The Paradoxes of Time Travel." American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 145-52. |
| 11 | Frankfurt on Alternate Possibilities |
Frankfurt, Harry. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (December 4, 1969): 829-839. Locke, John. "Anticipation of Frankfurt" In Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book II, 1689, chapter XXI, section 10. |
| 12 | Reactions to Frankfurt | |
| 13 | Strawson | Strawson, Peter. "Freedom and Resentment." In Free Will. |
| 14 | Reactions to Strawson |
Watson, Gary. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme." In Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Wolf, Susan. "The Importance of Freewill." Mind, New Series, 90 (1981). |
| 15 | Frankfurt's Higher Order Account | Frankfurt, Harry. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971). |
| 16 | Reactions to Frankfurt | Watson, Gary. "Free Action and Free Will." Mind, New Series, 96 (1987). |
| 17 | Reason Responsiveness; Wolf | Wolf, Susan. "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility." In Free Will. |
| 18 | Choosing; Intentions; Weakness of Will | Holton, Richard. "Intention and Weakness of Will." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-62. |
| 19 | Choice and Freedom | |
| 20 | Choice and Knowledge |
Velleman, David. "Freedom." Chapter 5 in Practical Reflection. New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 1989. ISBN: 0691073376. |
| 21 | Empirical Work: Social Psychology I |
Wegner, Daniel M., and Thalia Wheatley. "Apparent Mental Causation." American Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 480-492. Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Especially chapters 1-3. |
| 22 | Empirical Work: Social Psychology II |
Dancy, Jonathan. "Arguments From Illusion." Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 181 (October 1995). Byrne, Alex. "Some Like It HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts." Philosophical Studies 86, no. 2 (May 1997): 103-129. |
| 23 | Addiction |
Yaffe, Gideon. "Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency." Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2002). Robinson, Terry E., and Kent C. Berridge. "Addiction." Annual Review of Psychology 54 (2003): 25-53. Berridge, Kent C., and Terry E. Robinson. "The Mind of an Addicted Brain." Current Directions in Psychological Science 4/3 (1995). Watson, Gary. "Excusing Addiction." Law and Philosophy 3, no. 4 (1999): 351-365. |