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24.973 Advanced Semantics
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Semantics

$\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ iff $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{\text{the world of Sherlock Holmes}} = 1$

Problem: non-contingency

The semantics in (1) entails that $\ulcorner \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \urcorner$ would express a non-contingent proposition, i.e. a proposition which either is true in every world, or is true in no world
→ show this!

Semantics

$\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ iff $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{\text{the world of Sherlock Holmes as describe in } w} = 1$

→ show that the non-contingency problem no longer exists!

World = totality of facts...

$\llbracket \text{in the world of SH, Watson has an odd number of hairs} \rrbracket^w = ?$

→ Sir Conan Doyle did not give a complete world description, but an incomplete one which could be part of many different complete world descriptions

Semantics

$\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ iff in every world w' compatible with the Sherlock Holmes stories in w , $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w'} = 1$

Problem: non-specificity

Suppose Sir Conan Doyle wrote "Sherlock Holmes has a dog" and that was the only mention of Holmes' dog in the stories...

$\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, he has no dogs} \rrbracket^w = ?$

Semantics

$\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \rrbracket^w \neq \#$ only if $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ or $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \neg\phi \rrbracket^w = 1$; when $\neq \#$, $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ iff for every world w' compatible with the Sherlock Holmes stories in w , $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w'} = 1$

→ cf. Gajewski's neg-raising analysis: $\llbracket \alpha \text{ believes } \phi \rrbracket^w \neq \#$ only if $\llbracket \alpha \text{ believes } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ or $\llbracket \alpha \text{ believes } \neg\phi \rrbracket^w = 1$; when $\neq \#$, $\llbracket \alpha \text{ believes } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ iff for every world w' compatible with what α believes in w , $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w'} = 1$

Problem: non-continuities

Suppose at one place, Sir Conan Doyle wrote "SH has an odd number of hair" and at another, he (mistakenly) wrote "SH has an even number of hairs"...

→ $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes, he is a woman} \rrbracket^w = ?$

$\llbracket \text{believe } \phi \rrbracket^w = \lambda x. \forall w' \text{ compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w: \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w'} = 1$

$B = \lambda x. \lambda w. \{w' \mid w' \text{ is compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w\} = \lambda x. \lambda w. \lambda w'. w' \text{ is compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w$

$\llbracket \text{John believes } \phi \rrbracket^w = 1$ iff $\forall w' \in B(\text{John})(w): \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w'} = 1$

$B(\text{John})$ is an 'accessibility relation'

relation = something that is true of ordered pairs