from functionalism to externalism

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

(knowable) proposition p is knowable <u>a priori</u> iff p can be known independently of experience

otherwise, proposition p is knowable (only) <u>a posteriori</u>

a posteriori and necessary: water=H_2O	a posteriori and contingent: it's sunny
a priori and necessary: 2+3=5	a priori and contingent: ??

the view that mental states are <u>functional</u> states—states specified in terms of their causal relations to inputs, outputs, and other states

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

suppose functionalism is true

could you (at least 'in principle') write down the functional characterization of mental states just by reflecting on the meanings of mental vocabulary?

the <u>analytic functionalist</u> (or 'commonsense functionalist') says 'yes'

the <u>psychofunctionalist</u> (or 'empirical functionalist') says 'no'—science will tell us the functional story, not conceptual analysis

Lewis (the author of *On the Plurality of Worlds*) is an analytic functionalist

see 'Mad pain and Martian pain' in Readings

Putnam is a psychofunctionalist

psychofunctionalism is probably the more popular version

we will return to this issue when we discuss Chalmers' paper 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature'

STRONG STRONG AI: there is a computer program (i.e. an algorithm for manipulating symbols) such that any (possible) computer running this program literally has cognitive states

WEAK STRONG AI: there is a computer program such that any (possible) computer running this program and embedded in the world in certain ways (e.g. certain causal connections hold between its internal states and states of its environment) literally has cognitive states

Searle's official argument against strong AI fails

but he does have a point, namely that <u>merely implementing a program</u> is arguably insufficient for (underived) intentionality

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. `Di V`]WXca U]b`d\chc`Wci fhYgm`cZB5G5"

something else is needed— perhaps certain kinds of causal connections between the system and its environment

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

if we were trying to develop a functionalist account of belief, would the relevant sensory inputs involve distal objects in the system's environment (tomatoes, refrigerators, snow, etc.)?

or would the inputs be independent of the system's environment—patterns on the system's 'retina', e.g.?

if the latter, then a system could believe that there are tomatoes in the fridge even if it's never had any tomato input

Image removed due to copyright restrictions.
Brain in a vat.

is this possible with no Cambridge input?

# philosophical toolkit: extrinsic and intrinsic properties

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

perfect duplicates:

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

not-so-perfect duplicates:

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

a perfect
'3D printer'

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

property P is <u>intrinsic</u> iff it is necessarily shared between perfect duplicates

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

otherwise, P is <u>extrinsic</u>

there are many complications here, but we will ignore them; see the handout on properties and particulars

being cylindrical

having mass 200g

being red

   (intrinsic)

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

being a Campbell's soup can

having weight 200g

being in the cupboard

   (extrinsic)

are mental states intrinsic?

yes, according to:

Descartes (well, arguably—his dualism raises complications)

the identity theory (taken as theory of all mental states, not just properties like being in pain)

functionalism and behaviorism (on one natural way of spelling these theories out)

commonsense (?)

'thoughts are in the head!'

are mental properties of kind K intrinsic?

yes, according to <u>internalism</u> (about mental properties of kind K)

no, according to <u>externalism</u> (about mental properties of kind K)

we are about to look at some famous arguments for <u>externalism</u> about 'propositional attitude' properties like wanting a glass of water, believing that Cambridge is pretty, etc.

Images removed due to copyright restrictions. To read the article "Earth Twin's Found" by Erik Van Datiken, go to http://weeklyworldnews.com/aliens/8326/earths-twin-found.

Harvard Square

twin-Harvard Square

Hilary

twin-Hilary

Courtesy of Frederick Jao. Used with permission.

Courtesy of Frederick Jao. Used with permission.

Hilary's utterance is about Cambridge (not Twin-Cambridge, of which he has never heard)

his utterance is true iff Cambridge is pretty

the aesthetics of twin-Cambridge are totally irrelevant—if we imagine that twin-Cambridge is an imperfect duplicate of Cambridge (a twin Harvard Square, but exceptionally attractive elsewhere), then Hilary's utterance remains false, although twin-Hilary's utterance is true

Courtesy of Frederick Jao. Used with permission.

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Putnam on twin Earth, Burge, and Clark and Chalmers

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

24.09 Minds and Machines

Fall 2011