


# 24.09 Minds and Machines


## Fall 11 HASS-D CI

behaviorism



# propositions

false : true



## argument D

1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition  $p$  to be true, then  $p$  is possible. ('[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it' (p. 16))
  2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to my body is true, therefore:
  3. it is possible that I am not my body (there is a 'possible world' in which I am not my body), therefore:
- C. I am not my body

# philosophical toolkit: possible worlds





Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

we live in the  
best of all  
possible worlds




Gottfried  
Wilhelm Leibniz  
(1646–1716)



Cobe sky map showing temperature fluctuations in the early universe hidden among instrumental noise.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

# possible worlds and necessity/possibility



Cobe sky map showing temperature fluctuations in the early universe hidden among instrumental noise.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

possible worlds are ‘complete stories’—maximal ways the world might have been

a proposition is necessary iff it is true at every possible world

a proposition is possible iff it is true at some possible world

# an example

there might have been a talking donkey

there is a possible world in which there is a talking donkey




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## back to argument D

1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then p is possible. ('[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it' (p. 16))
  2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to my body is true, therefore:
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
???



- we will return  
to this step

# roadmap

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# philosophical toolkit: metaphysics and epistemology




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‘metaphysics’/metaphysical’

what there is (the ‘furniture of the universe’)

‘epistemology’/‘epistemological’

how/whether we have knowledge or justified  
belief

# two problems for dualism

1. mental causation  
a metaphysical problem
2. how do I know that you have a mind?  
an epistemological problem




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# behaviorism

why not reject this nonsense and go for the simplest theory?

the mind isn't some spooky unknowable cause of behavior

it is behavior (more-or-less)

behaviorism in psychology (Watson, Skinner) and behaviorism in philosophy followed parallel tracks, and they ran into sand at about the same time (late 50s, early 60s)\*

# the measure of a man

Image removed due to copyright restrictions. Two characters from Star Trek: The Next Generation.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Measure\\_of\\_a\\_Man\\_\(Star\\_Trek:\\_The\\_Next\\_Generation\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Measure_of_a_Man_(Star_Trek:_The_Next_Generation))

# reading for next session




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Smart

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